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MEMOP~NDUM
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to USDC Mass.

~~~' D.J.; Campbell, ~AJ,
concurring; Murray, D~J.,
dissenting)
~ ~~~;--

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR
OF MASSACHUSETTS

v.
FEENY, job applicant, nonveteran, woman

Federal/Civil

Timely

1. SUMMARY: Appt challenges the court's holding that
Mass. Gen. Laws c.31, §23, which affords veterans a preference
in obtaining state civil service jobs, violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
2. FACTS & DECISIONS: Historically, women have been
excluded from full participation in the nation's military forces.
'·-

From 1948 until 1967, a federal statute proh_ibited women from
making up more than two per cent of total personnel in the armed
forces.

The Army has continued a similar limit by regulation.
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Since 1884, Massachusetts has given veterans a
preference in obtaining public employment. Under present law,
the first step in getting a public job is to take an examination.
The test results in a composite score. Applicants who pass are
placed on an "eligible" list and rankec;l under the formula
established by §23, the statute in que stion here:
1. Disabled veterans in order of their composite
scores a
2. Other veterans in order of their composite scores.
3. Widows and widowed mothers of veterans in order
of their composite scores.
4. All other eligibles in order of their composite
scores.
When a job becomes available, the Civil Service Director
certifies candidates from the top of the eligible list, and
the hiring agency choosesfrom among those certified. Of 47 1 005
appointments made during a 10-year period ending in 1973,
14,476 went to male veterans and 374 went to female veterans.
Overall, 26,794 men were hired and 20,211 women.

fV

~ee,

a non-veteran, was a state employee who sought to

move up the administrative ladder. In 1971, she took an examination
for an available position, scored second, and, because of §23,
was listed sixth on the eligible list. She was not among those
certified and a male veteran with a lower grade got the job.
In 1973 her story repeated itself. The court found that in 1973
she would have been certified if the state had not given a
she
preference to veterans. In 1974/applied for yet · another job,
then
scored 17th and was ranked 70th. She/brough~ this lawsuit

3

alleging §23 discriminated against women. The three-judge
court held the statute denied her equal protection. Anthony
v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976). The
court enjoined the defendant state officers from enforcing
the statute, and the Massachusetts legislature enacted a
substitute law to have effect only during the pendency of
this case. Juris. Stat. App. C.
An appeal was taken to this Court and the Court
certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts the
question whether the Attorney General of that state could bring
an appeal when none of the named

defendants wanted to appeal.

Massachusetts v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976) ·. Mr. Justice
Blackmun would have dismissed for want of jurisdictiorl(!) The
Massachusetts court held the Attorney General had the authority
to prosecute the appeal. This

Co~

then vacated the judgment

and remanded for further consideration in light of Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434
U.S. 884 (1977) (No. 76-265) (prior pool memos are dated
10-6-76 and 9-28-77). Mr. Justice Brennan, Mro Justice Marshall
and Mr. Justice Powell would have noted probable jurisdiction.

On remand, the court reaffir.rned its prior holding.
The effect of veteran's preference is to exclude virtually all
women from the top civil service positions desired by meno
While the legislature's purpose, rewarding public service in
the military, was worthy, the means were not grounded on a
convincing factual rationaleo The preference -was not related to

job performance. Less drastic alternatives, such as a
system which added points to a veteran's test score, were
available. The preference was not limited to those who have
shortly returned to civilian life. Although the statute was
not designed for the sole purpose of subordinating women,
"its clear intent was to benefit veterans £ven at the expense
of women" and Davis was distinguishable. Here the discriminatory
impact was "natural, forseeable, and inevitable."

The

legislature could be charged with knowledge of sex discrimination
in the military, and, because in the past certain women-only
jobs were exempted, it could also be inferred that the leg i slature
preference
knew the/statute favored men. The impact on aee and her class
was "devastating." The preference was not job-related. Unlike
the defendants in Davis, the defendants here had not shown
affirmative recruiting efforts or a recent rise in the
proportion of the minority in the civil service workforce. Judge
Cambell concurred, saying the system was one "of absolute
preference which makes it virtually impossible for a woman, no
matter how talented, to obtain a state job that is also of
interest to males."

It was thus unlike the test in Davis

on which a black might "by dint of extra effort," improve his
score.
Judge Murray reiterated his prior dissent. The
preference statute is not on its face gender-based. It has
not been shown to be a pretext for discriminating against
women. It favors veteran women, and disfavors non-veteran men.

5
While the statute has a weightier impact on the relevant
group than did the test challenged in Davis, "impact alone
is not determinative." A legislature's choice to prefer
veteran>"implies invidious intent only if it appears
inconsistent with expected and valid considerations." While
the state could

co~sider

job-relatedness and relocation

benefits, it could also simply desire to reward veterans.
The statue is :rationally tailored to meet that goal, and
the less drastic alternatives posed by the majority would
also reduce the benefit to veterans. Since Davis, three
courts have rejected equal protection challenges to state
veteran's preference statutes. Bannerman v. Department of
Youth Authority, 436 F. Supp. 1273, 1279-1281 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (Schwarzer, Jo); Branch v. DuBois, 418 F. Supp. 1128,
1131-1133 (N.D. Ill. 1.976) (Tone CAJ; Will, Decker DJs);
Ballou v. State Department of Civil Service, 148 N.J. Super.
112, 372 A.2d 333 (N.J. App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 46 U.S.L.W.
2454 (NJ 1978)(per curiam).
3. CONTENTIONS:

Appt makes two arguments. First,

the district court's decision conflicts with Davis and
requires summary reversal. The proof of discriminatory intent
is insufficient. The statute is neutral on its face, and
the contrary

v~ew

expressed in a footnote in Judge Tauro's

opinion for the court, App. Alln.7, is without merit. By
relying on both forseeability of impact and actual impact to
show intent the court countermanded the instruction to heed

6

Davis, which held that intent cannot ' be inferred from impact
alone.

The additional factor relied on, the lack of job-relatedness,

is grossly overstated. The veteran's preference statute was
primarily intended to benefit qualified individuals for their
prior service to the nation. By focussing on job-relatedness
alone, the court confused the Equal Protection Clause with
Title VII. In its earlier opinion the court admitted the "purpose"
of the statute was not "disqualifying women."
Second, appt says the veterans' preference statute
rationally promotes legitimate state interests and so is
constitutional. Sex classifications are not judged by the
compelling state interest test. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). The court therefore erred in inquiring into
less restrictive alternatives.

With the exception of the

decision below, the federal courts have uniformly rejected
equal protection challenges to veterans' preference statutes.
Furthermore, because veteran's preference is merely one factor
that is considered in an elaborate civil service program,
it satisfies the constitutional test adopted by Mr. Justice
Powell in University of California v. Bakke, 46 U.S.L.W.
4896 (June 27, 1978).

lt

~ee

responds that the court analyzed the "totality

of the relevant facts" and properly found discriminatory intent
under Davis.

Subjective ill-will is not required. The

impact on women was both forseeable and devastating. Impact
is one indicator of intent. See United States v. School District

128
of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127/(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
46 U.S.L.W. 3526 (No. 77-728; Feb. 21, 1978). The district
court also relied on the state's historical

us~

of separate

requisitions for women, the exemption of those jobs from
the veteran's preference statute, and the resulting
paternalistic stereotyping.
Aee

also

maintai~that

the statute does not

meet the requirements of Craig, which are that it "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
This heightened scrutiny is justified because the statute
is based on "old notions" that a woman's place is in the
home, and it excludes women from jobs because of circumstances
beyond their control.

The district court properly found

that this statute is not carefully tailored to meet the
state's objectives because the state could use other means
to aid veterans which would not be at the expense of women.
4. DISCUSSION: The Court in Davis said impact could
show intent when impact could not be explained on nondiscriminatory
grounds. 426 U.S. at 242.
job~relatedness

Here the court reasoned that neither

nor relocation explained the statutory · strlicture,

yet failed to consider whether the third justification, rewarding
those who served, did so.

Even if the statutory structure

is sufficiently related to "old notions" to satisfy the intent
element, rewarding veterans may be important enough to enable

8

the statute to withstand scrutiny. Cf. Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)(discrimination against men in
naval discharges permissible).

The prior case of this

Court provide no definitive answer.
Both Bannerman and Branch involved point systems
which resemble the veteran's preference for most of the federal.
civil service. Consequently, those cases can be distinguished
from this one, where the preference is "absolute." The
conflict with Ballou, a New Jersey decision, however, is
square, and, if the judgment below were affirmed, the
veterans
constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. §3310, which gives/an absolute
as
preference for some jobs, e.g./elevator operators, would be
subject to serious question. See Anthony, 415 F.Supp. at
499n.l3.

~
On remand, C).ee sought to amend the complaint to add
a cause of action under the Equal Rights Amendment to the
Massachusetts state constitution. After the state stipulated
ff
that it would not raise the defense of estoppel if ~ee brought
a subsequent action· in state court, the court below denied
aee's motion.

Aee does not now argue that denial was in error

and therefore the state

constitutional question is not before

this Court.
There is a motion to affirm.
I would note probable jurisdiction.
9/25/78

MUnford

opinion in juris.
statement

To my mind there are at least two issues meriting
review here. Firs~)( I think there is a real problem concerning
the application~fvwashington v. Davis. It certainly seems
that there are ~lternative explanations for the veterans'
preference having nothin to do with discrimination against
women. Moreover, the preference discriminates agaLnst a
}
raFge number of men who also have not se~ved during wartime.
Second, there is the problem ofv.What state interest
is required to justify a statute that discriminates on the
basis of sex. Even if the justifications for the preference
yould be inadequate if this were a suspect classification,
\( they may be sufficient to support a sexual classification.
Accordingly, I would note.
David
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 20, 1979

78-233 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney
This is the troublesome case involving the
validity of Massachusett's Veterans Preference Act with
respect to civil service positions.
The case has been here twice before.

On the first

time we remanded it to ascertain whether - under
Massachusetts law - whether the Attorney General of ·the
state had authority to appeal over the express objections of
the nominal defendants.

On the second "round", we remanded

the case to the District Court for reconsideration in light
of Washington v. Davis.
The three-judge court, on this remand, reaffirmed
its prior decision invalidating the Veterans Preference
statute on the ground that it discriminated invidiously
against women.

A majority of the three-judge court met the

Washington v. Davis argument by concluding, in effect, that
the leqislature must have intended the natural and
inevitable effect of the statute:

namely, that women, so

few of whom were permitted to or did serve in military
service, were denied access to civil service positions.
Judqe Campbell's concurring opinion states, more
clearly than I have seen stated previously, the rationale of
washington v. Davis, and Arlington Heiqhts.

The Equal

;

. '<

·,_.

2.

Protection Clause simply cannot be applied literally so that
all state-conferred benefits will be available equally to
all citizens.

Judqe Campbell, nevertheless, concluded that

despite the facial neutrality of this statute, its
inevitable effect was discriminatory.
Massachusetts argues strongly to the contrary, and
it is supported by a 42-paqe amicus brief by the Solicitor
General (written by Frank Easterbrook).

The SG's brief

arques, persuasively, that the fallacy in the analysis of
,}(5

the three-judge District Court is that the statute was
intended to benefit veterans, a laudable and legitimate
purpose, and was not intended to discriminate against women.
If the doctrine of "purposeful discrimination" heretofore
deemed to be the meaninq of the Equal Protection Clause is
to be respected, and the authority of Davis and Arlinqton
Heiqhts, the SG arques that veterans preference statutes
must be sustained.

A qood deal of emphasis is placed on the

lonq history of such statutes, going back to President
Lincoln.

* * *
David:

I am not at rest in this important case,

and will need all the help I can get from my clerks.

In

view of the discriminatory impact of the statute, my "qut
reaction" is that it cannot be sustained under modern genderbased discrimination analysis.

'·

On the other hand, I do not

-

.

3.

want to undercut or weaken the authority of Davis and
Arlinqton Heights.

As stated by Judge Campbell, the Fqual

Protection Clause simply must have some principled limits,
and I cannot join an opinion that reasonably could have the
effect of invalidating classifications based on their
"impact" or even their "inevitable effect".

I do not want

O)A..-

to place equal protection analysis an "effects" basis
-"\

comparable to Title VII.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

'-"'I

~' &.t_· ~ ~UJ..~

DW 2/26/79

Bobtail Bench Memorandum
To:
Re:

Justice Powell
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney,
No. 78~233
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of

Massachusetts' statutory system of giving veterans preference
in the obtaining of stpte jobs.

The question is whether the

Massachusetts Legislature, in enacting the preference system,
had the "purpose" of discriminating against women.

The three-

judge court below, purporting to apply this Court's decision in
Washington v. Davis, 426

u.s.

229 (1976), ruled that the

discriminatory effect of the Massachusetts system was

.~

.

'· ('
•'

'

..

·''.. ,
·

'•'

,._•

2.
purposeful in that the legislators

p~ssed

the statute knowing

that it would have a severely disproportionate effect on women.
Appellants contend that in effect the lower court inferred
intent from the mere foreseeability of discriminatory
consequences, and that such an approach would emasculate the
intent requirement of Washington v. Davis.

The facts are

adequately set forth in the briefs, and I will proceed directly
to the legal issue involved.
1.

Discriminatory Effect

Despite the plain findings of the three-judge court to
the contrary, appellant suggests that, quite apart from the
Legislature's intent, the the Massachusetts veterans preference
scheme does not in fact discrimate against women.

Thus,

appellant contends that under the veterans preference system
many women nonetheless are hired to various posts in the
State's civil service;

indeed, more non-veteran women have

been hired in the last ten years than veteran men.
Additionally, one could contend that there is no discrimination
whatever against women as such.

Rather, the distinction is

between veterans and non-veterans.
--------------~

All non-veterans suffer an

·-

equal disability regardless of their gender.
I believe both of these arguments to be misplaced.

In

assessing the impact of the Massachusetts system, it is not
enough to compare the number of women hired with the number of
veteran men hired.

Rather, the correct comparison should be

between the percentage of women applying for civil service jobs

3.
who receive them, and the

percentag~

such jobs who receive them.

of veterans applying for

If, for example, only 10% of all

women applicants are given jobs, whereas 90% of all veteran
applicants are given jobs, the discriminatory effect of the
statute would be apparent.

Indeed, even these figures may not

adequately reflect the extent to which the Massachusetts system
affects women's participation in the State's civil service, as
there may be many women who would apply for jobs but for the
discouraging influence of the veterans preference.
Similarly, I find unpersuasive the argument that women
are not discriminated against here because they are treated
alike with all non-veterans.

It cannot be denied that those

who receive the benefits of the Massachusetts system are

----

largely men--in fact, 98% men.

Although the Massachusetts

system necessarily affects some men, therefore, it is

-

undeniable that the costs it imposes fall disproportionately
upon women.

-----..........

Under such circumstances, it is disingenuous to

say that there is no discriminatory impact upon women.
'--·-·

---....,____

-·

-

Of

course, the fact that the distinction is between veterans and
non-veterans may be strong evidence that it was not intended to
discriminate against women as such.

This, however, is a

question of the purpose of the disproportionate impact--not
whether such an impact exists.
2.

Discriminatory Intent or Purpose
'

The key question here, then, is whether the admittedly
~

disproportionate impact of the Massachusetts veterans

·.
·'

4.
preference scheme can be said to be "purposeful discrimination"
against women.
Housin~

In Vi llq_ge ,of Ar 1 ii;lgton .J:!e ights . v. Metropolitan

Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court suggested the

ways in which one could determine whether a legislative or
administrative act was intentionally discriminatory.

First,

the Court suggested that if there were a clear pattern of
otherwise unexplained discriminatory effect, a court might
infer a discriminatory purpose.

Alternatively, the Court

stated that the historical background of a governmental action

--------------

might demonstrate the purpose behind the action.

For example,

in some cases an unusual deviation from normal procedure or
substance would be a hallmark of some invidious objective.
Finally, the Court suggested that in some unusual circumstances
direct evidence from the decision makers might be called for.
In the present case, as I have discussed above, there
is a plainly disproportionate impact upon women.
is "a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or
Arl~nqton

debate.

Whether this

~~,"

Heights, at 266, is a question over which one might
Even if it is, however, there is an explanation for

the disparity of treatment that has nothing to do with women.
Thus, all the judges below were in apparent agreement that the
Massachusetts Legislature's desire in enacting a veterans

- ---------

preference scheme was only to benefit veterans--not to harm or
otherwise affect women.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that there

'---

little in the history of the veterans preference legislation
support an inference of invidious intent.

Although it

5.
cannot be denied that legislators (and people generally) had
'

conceptions concerning women in the nineteenth century that we
would consider anachronistic today, there is little evidence
that such notions played any substantial role in the framing of
Massachusetts' veterans preference statute.
Under the analysis set forth by the Court in Arlington
Heights, therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the
Massachusetts veterans preference statute is intentionally
discriminatory.

At the same time, however, in

Wash~ngt?n~

Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court explicitly stated that in
some cases the plainly disproportionate effect of a statute
~

would be probative evidence of a legislature's intent to
discriminate.

The difficult issue in this case, therefore, is

how best to reconcile the undeniable, express objective of the
Massachusetts statute (the benefitting of veterans) with the

7

undeniable, undoubtedly
disabling of women.)

~o~seen

effects of the statute (the

There are three possible arguments for

ignoring the plain objective of the Legislature and striking
down the Massachusetts statute as one that discriminate against
women:

(1) the statute incorporates the intentional

discrimination present in federal armed services policies;

(2)

a legislature should be deemed to "intend" the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of its actions; and (3) at some point,
the certainty and extent of discriminatory effect constitute
conclusive evidence of discriminatory intent.
each of these arguments in turn.

I shall address

6.
a.

Incorporation
Appellees argue strenuously that the statute in issue

here is quite different from the employment practice involved
in

Washi~gton

v.

Dav~s.

Thus, in Washington v. Davis the

employer administered a test neutral on its face to determine
job qualifications.

Although the results of this test

generally disfavored Negroes, there was no necessary tie
between the test and past acts of intentional discrimination.
Here, on the other hand, the Massachusetts statute explicitly
draws a distinction based upon service in the armed forces--a
quality that unquestionably h9s been distributed according to
gender on purpose.

Thus, appellees urge that legislative

actions should be deemed to be purposefully discriminatory
irrespective of the intentions or desires of the legislature,
provided that the actions incorporate the purposefully
discriminatory actions of others.

---

It is difficult, however, to cabin the principle
appellees argue for.

Thus, over time there have been countless

ways in which societal benefits and status have been given on
the basis of intentionally discriminatory criteria.

For

example, until the last twenty years many Negroes were
purposefully excluded from many colleges and universities.

To

say, however, that any distinction according to one's college
education is therefore purposefully discriminatory would be
absurd.

Thus, I would reject appellees' incorporation

argument, as I can see no ready limitation on its

7.

ramifications.
b.

Foreseeable Consequences
Alternatively, appellees contend (and are supported in

their contention by Judge Tauro's opinion below) that
legislatures, like tortfeasors, should be deemed to "intend"
the natural and foreseeable consequences of their acts.

The

foreseeability of the Massachusetts' statute's leading to a
disproportionate impact on women

is beyond question.

Thus,

appellees and Judge Tauro conclude that the Massachusetts
Legislature intended to discriminate against women.
One difficulty with the "foreseeablity" argument is
readily apparent:

Like appellees' incorporation argument, it

could not be limited in any way that would preserve the
effectiveness of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Washington~\

Davis limitation upon the

There is another fundamental difficulty

with this approach, however, as it misperceives the basic
rationale underlying the intent requirement of this Court's
decisions.

-

As I understand it, there are two good reasons for the

--

requirement that discrimination be intentional to be
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.

--

~

First, by

requiring an intent to discriminate, the Court eliminates many
general social equality questions.

For example, if

disproportionate impact were in itself enough to warrant
application of the Equal Protection Clause, every social
program enacted by Congress would have to be reviewed

·''

8.
statistically by the courts to
in what way.

deter~ine

who was affected and

Second, by permitting those actions motivated

solely by purposes other than invidious discrimination, the
Court allows legislatures to legislate for the social good
without constant monitoring and tinkering by the judiciary.

In

those cases where we know that no discriminatory purpose lay
behind an enactment, we may be reasonably certain that some
social benefit will result.

On the other hand, no such social

benefit is likely to be obtained by the application of
statutes, for example, that are designed to harm Negroes.
Under this rationale, it makes no sense whatsoever

t~

assume that legislatures intend the foreseeable consequences of
their actions.

--

Where legislatures act soley to achieve some

------

laudatory purpose, we have the necessary assurance that some

--

good will result, whether or not the legislature also is aware
that there will be some unavoidable, but incidental, disparate
impact.

Similarly, with the state of social science such as it

is, it is difficult to say that any effect of a given piece of
legislation was unforeseen by the legislating body.

In sum, I

conclude that the normal tort principles concerning
foreseeability of consequences are inapplicable to adjudication
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
c.

Certainty and Extent of Disparate Impact
Finally, one could adopt what I understand to be Judge

Campbell's approach and say that at some point the certainty
and extent of disparate impact is so great that it should be

9.
taken to be conclusive evidence of the legislature's intent.
(Alternatively, one could read Judge Campbell's opinion to say
that there is an exception to

Washington~.

disparate impact is great and certain.

Davis where the

These are, however,

only two ways of saying exactly the same thing.)
In many ways, this is the most attractive of the
alternative arguments presented for affirmance.

Thus, by

reading strictly the certainty and extent of the
disproportionate impact required, one could limit narrowly the
scope of this case.
Washing~on

For example, one could easily distinguish

v. Davis by noting that, although there was a

palpably different impact on Negroes applying for jobs in the
District of Columbia, no such certain difference was to be
anticipated with respect to the nation as a whole, which is the
area for which the employment test was adopted.

Indeed, a fair

reading of Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in WashingtoQ ~Davis would come close to this position.
Although Judge Campbell's position is attractive for
its narrow reach, I find it difficult to accept analytical!~.
._--......
Thus, insofar as certainty and extent of effect are probative
~~

of intent, there is little need to draw a per se rule that they
will be determinative in some cases.

Rather, it should be

sufficient to say, as the Court did in Waspinqton v. Davis,
that a court must take into account the sum total of the
circumstances and infer the purpose of the legislature or
agency.

The reason, of course, that Judge Campbell did not

,.,

'

'

1 0.

take this tack here is that he found it necessary to overcome
explicit findings that the objective of the Massachusetts
Legislature was solely to benefit veterans.

If the certainty

and extent of impact is not enough to overcome such evidence in
a general balancing procedure, however, then it should not be
enough to warrant any qeneral rule.

Unless you conclude that

the certainty and extent of the disparate impact in this case
is sufficient to overcome the manifest reason for the adoption
of the Massachusetts' veterans preference system, therefore, I
think you should vote to reverse the three-judge court.
3.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Court should carefully consider the
language it uses in writing this opinion.

Thus, I see this as

a valuable opportunity for setting forth with some clarity what
the Court means when it uses terms such as "purpose" and
"intent" in Fourteenth Amendment adjudication.

For me, there

is no meaningful distinction between the two words.

Moreover,

it is possible for a legislature to adopt a statute knowing it
will operate in a certain fashion without "intending" it to do
so.

Thus, I would adopt Professor Brest's notion that

something is a "purpose" of a decisionmaker in adopting a rule
only if it is an "effec[t] that the decisionmaker seeks to
establish or retain by promulgation of the rule."
supra, at 104.

See Brest,

In the present case, disabling women cannot be

said to be a purpose of the Legislature in adopting

-

Massachusetts' veterans preference system because we have no

11•

reason to believe that such disabling was anything that the
'

Massachusetts Legislators sought to bring about.
2/26/79

David
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JUSTICE WILUAM H . REHNQUIST

May 7, 1979

/

Re: No. 78-233 - Personnel Administrator of Mas$;-:;c husetts
v. Feeney

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

May 8, 1979

78-233 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney

Dear Potter:
Please ioin me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss

5/8/79

. c;~~
~

No. 78-233 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney

~

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court that although the ~

~

Masssachusetts Veterans Preference Statute overtly ~e~~~J~ ee_
discriminates against all nonveterans, it was
intended to discriminate against women.

never ~

I

therefore join the Court's opinion.
In doing so, I emphasize what is implied
in Part IV of the opinion:

Veterans' hiring

preferences "represent an awkward - and many argue,
unfair - exception to the deeply shared view that
merit and merit alone should prevail in the
employment policies of government."

Ante, at 23.

In view of the antiquity of such statutes at both
the national and state levels, and as the issue is
not before us, I express no considered
constitutional judgment.

But I do question the

social utility, if not the constitutional validity
of laws that have a seriously discriminatory effect
on women as well as a similarly discriminatory
effect - intended as such - against all nonveterans.
The traditional justifications advanced

2.
in support of veterans preference statutes may have
been valid when enacted earlier in our history.
See, ante, at 7.

One may doubt, however, the

rationality of these justifications in a period
when such a large percentage of the population is
composed of veterans of three major wars within the
past third of a century.

The record statistics in

this case are illuminating.

Over one-quarter of

the Massachusetts population are veterans.
at 13.

Ante,

It is said, as one of the state interests

served by those statutes that they "encourage
patriotic service" despite the fact that a large
percentage of all veterans were drafted.

Secondly,

it is argued that a purpose is to "ease the
transition from military to civilian life", a
transition that hardly extends for the lifetime of
a veteran - many if not most of whom became
civilians many years ago.

Nor is there reason to

believe that veterans generally are more "loyal and
well disciplined" than other applicants for state
employment.

This leaves, as perhaps the only

continuing justification, a desire "to reward
veterans for the sacrifice of military service".

3.
In many instances the sacrifice was indeed severe.
But as a justification for munificent and
indiscriminate preference, I find it unconvincing.

of tlrt ~t~ .itzrltg
'Dag!pngfott. gl. <!f. 20,5>1-.;J
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 8, 1979

Re:

No, 78-233 - Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney

Dear )?otter:
I

await the dissent,
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference

;§uprtm.t <!Jttu.rt ttf

tJr.t ~nitt~ .;%ihtttg

~ltilJrhtghm, ~ .

<!f.

20gt.lt.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N

May 8, 1979

Re: 78-233 - Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney
Dear Pot t er:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference

<!fttttrl of tltt ~tb ~taftg
JTagJringftttt. ~. '!f. 2LT~Jt;~

~tmt

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

May 17, 1979

Re:

/

No. 78-233 -- Personnel Administrator
of Massachusetts, et al.
v. Helen B. Feeney_.._.

Dear John:
Please add my name to your concurring
opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

~u.pttm:t Qfonrl.ttf tlrt~b ~ta#ll
..ufringhtn. ~. <!J. 20fi'!~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 23, 1979

Re:

78-233 - Personne; Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney

Dear Potter:
I join.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

<!Jcurl of flrt ~tfttb .§hdtlt
Jl'IW'lfhtgion.lB. <.q. 2l1p~~

.§ltptttttt

CHAMBERS OF

JusTtcE

w ...

May 25, 1979

J . BRENNAN, JR .

RE: No. 78-233

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have
prepared in the

above.

•
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

/

.:§u:prttttt <!Jctttt cf tfrt 'Jlltti:Uh j)taft~
~N$frhtghnt. Ifl.
CHAMBERS OF"

May 30, 1979

-JUSTICE Wo. . -.1. BRENNAN, -JR .

RE:

<!J. 20,?)1~

/

No. 78-233 Personnel Administrator, etc. v. Feeney

Dear Thurgood:
Since I've joined your fine dissent in the above,
I'll withdraw my separate dissent.
Sincerely,

lkl
Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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